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Structured Abstract  
Purpose – This paper examines the determinants of the EVA performance evaluation 
model for the Chinese banking industry. We investigate the impact of six bank-specific 
factors and corporate governance factors on financial performance.  
Design/methodology/approach – the authors use the ordinary least square regression 
to examine the determinants of the EVA performance evaluation model for the Chinese 
banking industry. Our findings are generally robust to alternative proxies of 
performance. 
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Findings – The empirical results indicate that credit risk, operational efficiency and the 
degree of innovation are positively related to banks’ EVA while capital management 
has a negative impact on it. In addition, although board size and independent directors 
are not related to the bank's EVA, from the perspective of the traditional performance 
evaluation indicators, executive compensation has a positive impact on the bank's 
profitability. 
Research limitations/implications – This paper has some limitations. Firstly, due to 
the large number of adjustments to accounting items are required in the application of 
EVA when evaluating business performance, some items of EVA model in this paper 
have been simplified, which may cause the bank's EVA value to deviate slightly from 
the actual situation. Moreover, the sample includes only listed banks, so our results 
cannot generalize to non-listed banks, such as some small and medium-sized 
commercial banks. 
Originality/value – This paper contributes to the limited body of literature concerning 
the use and the determinants of EVA in emerging markets. We construct an EVA model 
which is suitable for China's banks and report comprehensive evidence on the drivers 
of EVA as a measurement tool. 
 
Keywords: Bank Performance, EVA, Corporate Governance, Bank Specific Factors, 
China, Innovation.  




 1. Introduction 
 
Previous research has indicated that the application of EVA varies substantially across 
organizations and that variations are due to differences in the regulatory environments 
and industry specific characteristics (Worthington & West 2001; Chiwamit et al., 2017: 
Chiwamit et al., 2014; Burkert and Lueg, 2013; McLaren et al., 2016). Banks, as a 
special industry, are the mainstay of the market economic activities and the modern 
financial system, occupying an important position in a country's financial and even 
economic systems. Particularly, in order to adapt to the fast-paced developing in 
  3 
China’s economy and the increasingly fierce competition in the external market, the 
Chinese banking industry has implemented a series of reform measures since 1997 
(Sufian, 2009).  
 
In pre-1978 era, China did not have a banking system in the modern sense. After 
experiencing the stage of the two-tiered banking system and the stage of state-owned 
commercial banks, the Chinese banking industry has gradually transitioned to the stage 
of the state-owned commercial banks (Heffernan and Fu, 2010). Since 2000, China has 
begun to encourage and promote the reorganization and listing of China's state-owned 
commercial banks and expand the scale to meet the challenges brought by the full 
opening of the financial industry after China's accession to the world trade organization. 
By the end of 2010, the four state-owned commercial banks successively completed the 
public offering of shareholding reforms, the business cooperation between joint-stock 
banks continued to deepen and the rural credit cooperatives became city commercial 
banks (CBRC, 2016). 
 
With the banking reforms, China's banking industry has shifted from a traditional 
expansion model focusing on scale and speed to a profit-oriented management focusing 
on capital constraints, risk control, and asset quality. Maximizing value as the goal of 
bank management has become the consensus of shareholders, bank managers and 
operators (Heffernan and Fu, 2010). However, in practice, the China's banks still follow 
a performance evaluation system based on indicators such as total return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Since the business risk and capital cost are not 
considered, this traditional performance evaluation system deviates from the banks’ 
business objectives of maximizing shareholders' interests and corporate value. 
Therefore, how to construct a reasonable bank performance evaluation system to guide 
the behaviour of bank managers and operators has become an important research topic 
internationally and in China's banking industry. 
 
The Economic Value Added (EVA) could make up for the shortcomings of traditional 
performance evaluation indicators and meet the management objectives of China's 
banking industry on maximizing shareholder value. EVA is considered as one of the 
innovations with a long-standing pedigree in conventional management accounting 
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thought, but also assuming wider societal relevance (Chiwamit et al., 2014, p145). EVA, 
presented by Stern Stewart in 1982, measures the added value of corporate wealth. It 
has been registered to form a financial management system, incentive system and 
decision-making mechanism led by the concept of economic value added (Stewart 
1991). Stewart (1991) defined EVA as "the difference between the profits each unit 
derives from its operations (NOPAT) and the charge for capital each unit incurs through 
the use of its credit line". Unlike traditional performance evaluation indicators such as 
ROA and ROE, EVA examines the company's residual profit, that is, the net value after 
deducting the direct cost of borrowed capital and the indirect cost of equity capital 
(Sabol and Sverer, 2017).  
This is consistent with the essence of economic profit. Moreover, EVA redefines the 
profit of the company from the perspective of shareholders, considering the cost of all 
capital invested by the company (including equity capital), which is almost the same as 
the requirement of maximizing shareholders' wealth. Furthermore, in the calculation of 
EVA, the company also needs to adjust the financial information that the business 
managers may manipulate, which makes the EVA indicators closer to the real 
performance of the enterprise (Mamun and Mansor, 2012). In addition, the application 
of EVA could establish an effective incentive compensation system, linking operating 
performance with EVA to alleviate agency problem, and encourage managers to pay 
full attention to the company's capital appreciation and long-term economic benefits 
(Worthington & West 2001; Fatimi et al, 2003).Thus, we argue that the alignment of 
managerial interests and incentives with the preferences of shareholders can be 
potentially achieved through the use of EVA (Sabol and Sverer, 2017; Chiwamit et al., 
2014; Bouwens and Spekle 2007).  
 
In the practical application of EVA, compared with some internationally renowned 
companies such as Coca-Cola, IKEA, Wal-Mart, the application of EVA in the banking 
industry started relatively late. In 1994, Centaur Bank from the United States first 
introduced EVA to its performance evaluation system, and then internationally 
renowned banks including Citibank also joined the ranks of EVA users. In the Chinese 
banking industry, China Construction Bank (CCB) introduced the EVA indicator for the 
first time in 2002. Starting with the goal of maximizing bank value, CCB affirmed the 
important role of EVA in the performance evaluation of commercial banks. 
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Subsequently, other large state-owned commercial banks and Joint-stock commercial 
bank such as Industrial Bank (IB) also began to try to introduce EVA into their 
performance management system. Therefore, the introduction of EVA into the banking 
industry is probably a general trend in the future. 
 
While previous studies addressed the applications and the effectiveness of EVA, the 
current study aims to examine the determinants of EVA in the Chinese banking industry 
(Uyemura et al, 1996; Fraker, 2006; Franco and Philip, 2007; Gabriela et al, 2009; Soral 
and Bhanawat, 2009; Worthington & West 2001). Particularly, we examine the impact 
of a set of bank specific factors (liquidity and credit risks, executive compensation, 
operational efficiency, and capital management) on bank performance. Furthermore, 
we address the effects of innovation and corporate governance characteristics (board 
size, independence and compensation) on the performance of Chinese banks. 
 
Using a sample from 2012 to 2017, our study finds that credit risk (LLR), operational 
efficiency (C/B), capital management (CAR) and the degree of innovation (NIIR) are 
affecting the EVA value of China's listed banks. These findings suggest that improving 
the operation efficiency and the degree of innovation, ensuring a certain level of credit 
risk and a certain level of capital adequacy ratio could help improve the bank's operating 
performance. In contrast, we find no evidence that corporate governance characteristic 
(Board Size and Proportion of independent directors) have significant impact on EVA 
value of China's listed banks. Although board Size and proportion of independent 
directors are not related to the bank's EVA, executive compensation has a positive 
impact on the bank's profitability. These results imply that executive compensation 
schemes can help alleviate the agency problem in publicly listed banks and thus 
maximize shareholder value (Omoregie and Kelikume, 2017; Malmi and Ikäheimo 
2003). 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in different ways. Firstly, there is no 
uniform standard for the EVA calculation formula of the banking industry (Uyemura et 
al, 1996; Fraker, 2006; Gabriela et al, 2009; Soral and Bhanawat, 2009), thus this paper 
attempted to construct an EVA model which is suitable for China's banks. Secondly, 
although existing literature addressed the determinants of bank's profitability, most 
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studies still use the traditional accounting indicators such as ROA and ROE to measure 
the bank's profitability (Bennaceur and Goaied, 2008; Sufian and Chong, 2008; Sufian, 
2009; Ali et al, 2011; Aladwan, 2015; Petria et al, 2015).Our study is one of the few 
studies that empirically examined the key factors affecting the creation of banks value 
under the condition of EVA as a measurement tool (Heffernan and Fu, 2010). Moreover, 
we provide comprehensive evidence on the drivers of EVA as a measurement tool. 
While most research is still limited to a number of bank-specific factors (Bennaceur 
and Goaied, 2008; Sufian and Chong, 2008; Sufian, 2009; Heffernan and Fu, 2010; Ali 
et al, 2011; Aladwan, 2015; Petria et al, 2015), our study addresses the impact of 
executive compensation, degree of innovation, board size and independence on EVA as 
a measurement of bank performance. By doing so, our study provides insights about 
new factors that may affect the creation of banks value under the condition of EVA as 
a measurement tool, and thus guide the banks to allocate resources to places that create 
more value. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic concepts, 
features and construction of EVA model in the banking sector. Literature review and 
hypotheses development are outlined in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the data and 
method. Section 5 presents the results while Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. EVA as a Measure of Performance 
2.1 Basic Concepts of EVA Evaluation Indicators 
Economic Value Added (EVA) refers to the difference between the net profit after tax 
of the enterprise and the total cost of capital invested in the operation of the enterprise 
during a certain period (Sabol and Sverer, 2017). It is not a new concept but an 
extension of residual income and economic profit, which represents the ability of 
enterprise value creation (Sharma and Kumar, 2010). When the company's post-tax net 
operating profit exceeds the total capital cost of the investment, the EVA is positive, 
and the value created by the company brings about an increase in the shareholder's 
wealth (Sabol and Sverer, 2017). Conversely, if the EVA is negative, the company's 
operating income is not enough to cover all the capital costs, including debt capital and 
equity capital costs, resulting in a reduction in shareholder wealth (Mamun and Mansor, 
2012). The formula for EVA can be expressed as: 
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EVA=NOPAT–WACC×TC 
Thus, EVA is mainly composed of three elements that is NOPAT, TC and WACC. 
NOPAT indicates the net profit after tax operation of the enterprise, that is, the sum of 
net profit after tax and interest expense, which is the profitability of the company after 
the capital structure is removed (Sharma and Kumar, 2010). All calculation factors of 
net operating profit after tax could be obtained from the financial statements disclosed 
by the company. Specifically, the company’s operating income is the remaining part 
which deducted from the costs and expenses consumed in the production and operation 
process as well as the income tax (Mamun and Mansor, 2012). Thus, NOPAT could be 
understood as the real profitability of the company's assets. TC represents the total 
investment capital of the company, including debt capital and equity capital (Sabol and 
Sverer, 2017). Among them, debt capital refers to short-term loans and long-term loans 
provided by creditors other than commercial liabilities such as accounts payable, notes 
payable and other payables (Jakub et al, 2015). The cost of equity consists of common 
stock and minority shareholders' equity. Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 
the average unit cost calculated from the weight of the debt cost and the cost of equity 
in the total capital structure. The critical problem in calculating WACC is the estimation 
of the cost of equity capital (Jakub et al, 2015). The most widely used is the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAMP) (Sabol and Sverer, 2017). 
 
In addition, in order to further ensure the reliability of EVA calculations, certain 
adjustments must be made to specific accounting items in the income statement and 
balance sheet (Sharma and Kumar, 2010). Since the EVA indicator was not specifically 
pointed to a certain industry when it was proposed, Stern Company gave a total of 160 
accounting adjustment items for the specific measurement of the EVA model when they 
first introduced the EVA evaluation system (Mamun and Mansor, 2012). They pointed 
out that when applying the EVA indicator, the company needs to choose these 
accounting adjustments according to the actual position of the company. In general, the 
required adjustments in the optimal EVA calculation formula should be within 15 items 
(Mamun and Mansor, 2012). Therefore, it is one of the contributions of this paper to 
select the adjustments according to the characteristics of the banking industry, as will 
be discussed in section 2.2 
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2.2 Features of the EVA Model in the Banking Sector 
Banks, unlike ordinary industrial enterprises, mainly operate in the form of currency, 
while providing financial products and services (Li and Guan, 2009). Their capital 
structure, profit-making methods and risks are special. Therefore, in the process of 
applying the EVA analysis method, the banking industry needs to pay attention to the 
accounting adjustment of the basic formula of EVA according to the particularity of the 
banking industry (Shreenivasan and Vaijayanthi, 2011). 
 
Compared with enterprises in the other industries, it could be found that there is a big 
difference between banks and the general enterprises in their capital structure, which is 
a high-debt operation (Shreenivasan and Vaijayanthi, 2011). Banks only consider the 
cost of equity capital, rather than dividing capital into debt capital and equity capital 
according to the general practice. This is because the bank's main business is to absorb 
deposits and issue loans, and its liabilities are mainly derived from the deposits of 
corporate and residents (Gabriela et al, 2009). According to the requirements of the 
Basel Concordat, the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks need to reach 8%, 
which means that the asset-liability ratio of banks would reach 90% (Li and Guan, 
2009). In order to generate higher income, banks usually keep their capital adequacy 
ratio above 8% to meet the standard, thus banks generally have high debt ratios. 
 
From the perspective of profit-making methods, the main commodity of banks is capital 
and their main form of profit is realized by issuing loans to enterprises that need funds 
(Li and Guan, 2009). In contrast, the profit-making method of general enterprises is to 
sell goods or provide processing services to obtain profits. Therefore, the interest paid 
by the banking is both a cost of debt and a part of operating expenses (Shreenivasan 
and Vaijayanthi, 2011). Due to the existence of statutory capital, the amount of interest 
expenses of banks is relatively large. Thus, adding the interest expense back to the net 
profit will lead to overvalued cost of capital. 
 
Moreover, the risks that commercial banks bear have certain specialties. Different from 
the industrial enterprises with cash as the king, the key to the survival of banks lies in 
the control of risks, which means the core of financial management for banks is risk 
management (Shreenivasan and Vaijayanthi, 2011). This is because the operation of the 
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banking industry is closely related to the country level financial system; when the 
national economy is in crisis, banks generally would be affected (Li and Guan, 2009). 
Similarly, if banks have risks for various reasons, they would also affect the 
development of the entire country's economy that why banking industry is heavily 
regulated. Therefore, the important role of banking capital is to resist risks, and the 
scale of capital should be matched with the anticipated risks. This is also an important 
reason for the difference between EVA measurement in the banks and industrial 
enterprises. 
 
2.3 Construction of EVA Model in the Banking Sector 
According to the characteristics of the banks, it is necessary to make some special 
adjustments when constructing the EVA Model in the Banking Sector.The first step in 
calculating EVA is to adjust the company's net profit to produce its NOPAT (Gabriela 
et al, 2009). According to the previous literature, the adjustment of NOPAT in the 
banking sector could be divided into four parts: Interest expense, provision for loan loss, 
non-recurring events and deferred taxes. 
 
As mentioned in the last section, due to the particularity of the banking industry, interest 
charges are included in the NOPAT. According to Gabriela et al. (2009) and 
Shreenivasan and Vaijayanthi (2011), the definition of net operating profit after tax in 
the EVA calculation formula reflects the portion of after-tax profit plus interest expense. 
But for the bank, the deposit business itself is a kind of debt, and the interest generated 
by the loan business is its main business income. Therefore, in the adjustment of net 
operating profit after tax, interest income is not adjusted. 
 
Provision for loan losses is one of the most common adjustments for a bank. (Gabriela 
et al, 2009). Under GAAP, banks need to increase its loan loss reserve with an equal 
amount expensed as provision for loan losses, aiming to write off a portion of each loan 
as soon as possible (Fraker, 2006). The reserve includes estimated loss adjustments for 
existing loans and estimates of future loan losses associated with new loans (Uyemura 
et al, 1996). This accounting rule would cause two adverse effects. On the one hand, 
the provision for loan losses is only on the principle of prudence and banks have not 
actually suffered losses. It is easy to widen the gap between accounting profit and cash 
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flow, as well as underestimate the actual profitability and the actual amount of total 
assets (Fraker, 2006). On the other hand, the provision for loan losses has a certain 
degree of discretion. Thus, the bank's managers have an opportunity to use this 
discretion to manipulate the measurement and the reporting of the provisions to meets 
the manager's expected demand (Uyemura et al, 1996). Therefore, when calculating the 
EVA index of a commercial bank, the amount of change in provision for loan losses 
should be subtracted from the after-tax profit. 
 
Non-recurring events refer to the events, which are not related to bank operations, and 
the resulting gains and losses are contingent, such as debt restructuring gains and losses, 
sales of fixed assets and intangible assets and government subsidies. Uyemura et al 
(1996) stated that the main non-recurring event of the banking industry in recent years 
is restructuring costs. Due to such expenses might represent a divestment, it should not 
be considered as a reduction in operating profit and the adjustment should be made after 
tax. These non-recurring income or losses are generally recorded in non-operating 
income and non-operating expenses (Fraker, 2006). The bank's non-operating income 
and expenses do not reflect the true business conditions of the bank. Therefore, non-
operating income and expenses should be excluded when calculate the NOPAT of banks. 
Deferred income tax arises from differences in the tax bases provided for by the tax law 
and the tax bases set out in the accounting standards. Deferred tax assets and liabilities 
are expenses that should be deducted or paid in the future (Uyemura et al, 1996). Thus, 
another adjustment to EVA model is to add the deferred income tax back to the NOPAT 
of banks. Particularly, consistent with Fraker, (2006) we added deferred income tax 
liabilities and minus deferred income tax assets 
 
According to the above explanation of adjustments, the adjusted formula of NOPAT is 
as follow： 
 
NOPAT= Net profit + Change in Provision for loan losses× (1- Income tax rate) - (Non-
operating income - Non-operating expenses) × (1- Income tax rate) + Change in 
Deferred income tax liabilities - Change in Deferred income tax assets 
 
The total capital (TC) refers to the book value of all capital operated by the company, 
  11 
including debt capital and equity capital (EC). Due to the particularity of the bank's 
capital structure mentioned above, most of the debt capital of banks is reflected in the 
statement of the banking industry as an operating liability, and its interest expenses 
constitute a declining income (Gabriela et al, 2009). In addition, the regulatory 
authorities have strict limits on the minimum capital adequacy ratio according to Basel 
III, thus debt capital only accounts for a small proportion of total capital in the banking 
sector (Li and Guan, 2009). If the capital is calculated based on the method of the 
general enterprise, the capital cost of the bank will be overestimated. Therefore, the 
"total equity" is often based on its equity capital figure when calculating the bank’s 
EVA (Fraker, 2006). 
 
According to Uyemura et al., (1996), the total capital for banks could be summarized 
from the adjustments discussed above for NOPAT, which contains three components: 
loan loss reserves (after taxes), other net deferred tax credits and Non-recurring events 
(after taxes). According to the above explanation of adjustments, the adjusted formula 
of TC is as follow： 
 
TC = Total equity capital + Reserve for NPLs × (1- Income tax rate) - (Non-operating 
income - Non-operating expenses) × (1- Income tax rate) + Deferred income tax 
liabilities - Deferred income tax assets 
 
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the basic rate of return and opportunity 
cost required by corporate investors to invest in capital (TC), which is the price that 
companies must pay for using capital. Since the total capital only considers equity 
capital, only the capital cost rate needs to be calculated when calculating the WACC. 
Thus, we use capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to calculate the cost of capital (Fraker 
2006), Gabriela et al., 2009, Soral and Baharat, 2009) for the calculation of the cost of 
capital, our paper uses capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to calculate the cost of 
capital. 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses development  
Previous literature have examined the impact of bank-specific factors on banking 
performance in different countries (Sufian 2009; Heffernan and Fu 2010; Petria et al., 
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2015; and Bennaceur and Goaied 2008; Sufian and Chong 2008; Ali et al., 2011). In 
addition to the bank specific factors, some studies have addressed the impact of 
corporate governance such as board size, independence and executive compensation on 
bank performance in recent years (Malmi and Ikäheimo 2003; Tulung and Ramdani 
2018; Mariappan and Thyagarajan 2018; Fernandes et al., 2018). Therefore, this paper 
will extend the existing research by addressing the following nine determinants of 
profitability in the banking sector. 
 
3.1 Bank size 
The impact of bank size on bank profitability is controversial. On the one hand, banks 
have economies of scale (Sufian, 2009; Heffernan and Fu, 2010; Sufian and Chong, 
2008). When the scale of bank size is expanded, the fixed costs will not increase due to 
the increase in the proportion of moving costs, so the unit product cost will decrease 
and the bank's profit rate will rise (Petria et al, 2015). Sufian (2009) found that a positive 
relationship between bank size and profitability in China. On the other hand, this 
expansion of bank size does not mean an affirmative increase in the level of bank 
performance (Heffernan and Fu, 2010). The economies of scale for banks may reach a 
certain upper limit. This is because the increased diversification due to economies of 
scale might reduce the bank's credit risk and thus reduce returns (Sufian and Chong, 
2008). Bureaucracy and other reasons, such as Chinese government interventions for 
the banking industry, may also have a negative impact on the bank's profitability (Petria 
et al, 2015). For instance, Sufian and Chong (2008) and Aladwan (2015) found that size 
is negatively correlated with the profitability of banks. However, some other studies 
found that there is no relation between bank size and profitability (Bennaceur and 
Goaied 2008; Heffernan and Fu 2010; Ali et al., 2011; Petria et al., 2015) Consistent 
with prior studies, the first hypothesis is as follows. 
 




Liquidity risk refers to the risk that a bank cannot adapt to the decrease in liabilities or 
the increase in assets on the balance sheet, which is an important determinant of 
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banking performance (Sufian, 2009). Comparing with other bank assets, the loans 
particularly the credit to resident and companies is risky and has more return (Sufian 
and Chong, 2008). Thus, it could be argued that liquidity is positively related to a bank’s 
profitability. However, due to the high operational cost of loans such as screening and 
monitoring, the more loans might cause lower profitability of banks (Petria et al, 2015). 
Sufian (2009) and Sufian and Chong (2008) confirmed this view, and they found that 
the liquidity of the banking industry in China and the Philippines is negatively 
correlated with profitability. Heffernan and Fu (2010) found that the influence of 
liquidity is insignificant. Therefore, the second hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significantly negative relationship between liquidity and the 
bank's EVA. 
 
3.3 Credit Risk 
Credit risk is related to the bank's ability of sustainable operation and profitability. For 
China's banking industry, the main business is still focused on deposits and loans, which 
means changes in credit risk could be reflected by the changes in the health of bank 
loan portfolios (Sufian and Chong, 2008). Non-performing loans refer to loans in which 
some of the borrowers’ repayment ability has obviously become problematic, which 
means the borrowers cannot meet the repayment requirements relying on their normal 
operating income. Even if a bank has a guarantee, it cannot fully recover the cost, and 
there are even some cases where the loan cannot be recovered (Petria et al., 2015). Non-
performing loans as a part of the bank’s assets but have seriously affected the bank’s 
asset quality. Loan loss reserve refers to the provision for non-performing loans, which 
indicates the bank's asset quality and signal changes (Sufian, 2009). Higher provisions 
could indicate the possibility of loan losses in the future, but this may also show the 
bank's prudence and timeliness in estimating its non-performing loan (Heffernan and 
Fu, 2010). Prior studies found that credit risk and bank's performance are negatively 
correlated (Sufian and Chong 2008; Ali et al., 2011; Petria et al., 2015), Therefore, the 
third hypothesis is as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a significantly negative relationship between credit risk and the 
bank's EVA. 
 
  14 
3.4 Operational Efficiency 
Bank’s operational efficiency (OE) refers to the management capacity of banks (Petria 
et al., 2015). In general, the higher the operational efficiency, the higher the profitability 
of the bank (Sufian, 2009). There are two main indicators for judging the capability of 
operational efficiency. One is the cost-to-income ratio, which reflects the percentage of 
bank operating costs as a percentage of income (Heffernan and Fu, 2010; Ali et al, 2011; 
Petria et al, 2015). The other is the ratio of overhead to total assets, which represents 
the total amount of wages and salaries of banks, as well as the cost of operating branch’s 
facilities (Sufian, 2009; Sufian and Chong, 2008). However, no matter which indicator 
is used, it has a reverse relationship with the operational capability, that is, it has a 
reverse relationship with the performance of the bank. Previous studies conclude that 
the operational efficiency has a significantly positive relationship with bank's 
profitability (Sufian 2009, Heffernan and Fu 2010; Petria et al. 2015). Therefore, the 
forth hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is significantly positive relationship between operational efficiency 
and the bank's EVA. 
 
3.5 Capital Management 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has always been the focus of banks and regulators, but 
its impact on bank profitability is not clear. From a micro perspective, all kinds of 
banking institutions, such as central banks and commercial banks, must have certain 
ability to withstand risks, so that banks can minimize the banking crisis when the 
operating environment deteriorates (Li and Guan, 2009). This ability to withstand risks 
is externally manifested in the bank's own capital, that is, the equity. The capital 
adequacy ratio reflects the ability of the banking industry to respond to liquidity risks 
and the solvency (Sufian and Chong, 2008). Therefore, in theory, the bank's capital 
adequacy ratio is positively related to its profitability (Sun et al, 2017). The empirical 
findings of Sufian (2009) and Sufian and Chong (2008) support this view. From another 
perspective, Petria et al. (2015) pointed out that capital replenishment also may led to 
a reduction in the number of funds available to banks, which might increase the cost of 
the bank's operations and lose more profitable investment opportunities. Moreover, the 
measurement of the EVA indicator is not only subject to the bank's profit level, but also 
  15 
emphasizes the hidden cost of the capital occupied. Heffernan and Fu (2010) used the 
EVA as an indicator of bank performance in their study and found a significant negative 
relation between capital adequacy and bank performance. Ali et al. (2011) used ROA 
and ROE as the indicators of bank performance and find similar results. Therefore, the 
fifth hypothesis is as follows.  
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a significantly negative relationship between capital 
management and the bank's EVA. 
 
3.6 Degree of innovation 
The ability of innovation is important for the sustainable development of banks. In 
currently, the competition for the banking industry is becoming more and fiercer 
because their competitors are not only limited to banks, but also include various fund 
companies and other emerging financial companies (PWC, 2015). For example, the Yu 
Ebao, which launched by Alibaba and Tianhong Asset Management Limited Company, 
has made the Chinese banking industry feel a sense of crisis (PWC, 2015). Banks can 
no longer rely on the traditional deposit and loan business to make profits but need to 
innovate and develop its financial products. These financial innovations are reflected 
in the off-sheet account named “non-interest income” and the non-interest income ratio 
shows the degree of innovation for the banking sector (Sufian and Chong, 2008).  
Sufian and Chong (2008) found that the degree of innovation is positively associated 
with bank performance. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis is as follows.  
 
Hypothesis 6: There is significant positive relationship between the degrees of 
innovation and the bank's EVA. 
 
3.7 Executive compensation 
Since the global financial crisis and the collapse of the market in 2007-2008, scholars 
have renewed interest in executive compensation levels and shifted their research focus 
from the non-financial industry to the financial industry (Guo et al., 2015). Executive 
compensation is the compensation plan given to the Chief Executive Officers (CEO) 
and other senior executives who are responsible for managing corporate affairs 
(Omoregie and Kelikume, 2017). In previous studies, there were different perspective 
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about the impact of executive compensation on the banking performance. The 
alignment theory believes that giving incentives to the bank's executives could help the 
manager and the owner's goals to be aligned, which would reduce agency costs and 
promote managers to create maximum value for shareholders (Omoregie and Kelikume, 
2017). However, the entrenchment theory states that higher compensation might lead 
the executives not paying attention to the development of the bank, but only seeking 
smooth performance, which would harm the interests of banks. Malmi and Ikäheimo 
(2003) pointed out that the EVA evaluation system is not only an evaluation method but 
also a comprehensive management mechanism. Establishing an incentive mechanism 
around EVA could maximize the coordination between managers and shareholders. 
Therefore, combining theoretical analysis with evidence from existing literature, the 
seventh hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 7: There is a significantly positive relationship between the executive 
compensation and the bank's EVA. 
 
3.8 Board Size 
The board is the intermediate coordination mechanism between shareholders and 
managers, which need to accept the trust from the shareholders to manage the company 
as well as supervise and motivate managers (Fernandes et al, 2018). According to the 
theory of resource dependence, the increase in the number of directors means the 
increase in the resources available to the board of directors, which has the positive 
influence on the company's performance (Mohammed et al., 2017; Tulun and Ramdani, 
2018). However, as the size of the board of directors expands, the agency problem 
becomes more and more prominent. When the number of board members exceeds the 
optimal range, the more time it takes for the coordination of the board members to ask, 
and the negative effect of the communication would exceed its positive effect 
(Fernandes et al., 2018). Mariappan and Thyagarajan (2018) found that board size was 
significantly related to performance when board size was between 6 and 9. Due to the 
large size of the board of Chinese banking companies, the difficulty of internal 
coordination increases, and the decision-making efficiency becomes lower. Therefore, 
the eighth hypothesis is as follows. 
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Hypothesis 8: There is a significantly negative relationship between board size and the 
bank's EVA. 
 
3.9 Proportion of independent directors 
Independent directors refer to committee members who are not associated with 
directors, other committee members and controlling shareholders (Fernandes et al, 
2018). Due to the ‘independence’ of independent directors, the increase in the 
proportion of independent directors could effectively supervise the behaviour of 
ordinary directors. Independent directors would attempt to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders and stakeholders, which is conducive to the company's long-term 
sustainable development (Tulun and Ramdani, 2018). In addition, they often have high 
professional knowledge or professional experience when they are appointed, which 
could also have a positive impact on the business performance of commercial banks 
(Fernandes et al, 2018). Tulun and Ramdani (2018) and Mariappan and Thyagarajan 
(2018) found the significant positive correlation between the proportion of independent 
directors and the bank’s performance. Therefore, the ninth hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 9: There is a significantly positive relationship between proportion of 
independent directors and the bank's EVA. 
 
 
4. Data and Method 
4.1 Sample selection 
This study sample consists of listed banks in China, for the period starts in 2012 and 
ends in 2017. The initial sample consists of 17 banks, as listed in year-end 2012.We 
exclude the Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank (CQRCB) due to the inconsistency in 
currency measurement and accounting standards. Therefore, the final sample includes 
the data for the six years of the 16 banks in China that are listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which totalled 96 firm year observation. The 
specific name, abbreviation, stock code and classification of samples are shown in 
Appendix 1. And the data sources of this paper are the FitchConnect, CSMAR 
databases and annual reports of each bank. 
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4.2 Dependent variables 
The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of Economic Value Added (EVA) 
in Chinese Listed Banks. However, the EVA is an absolute indicator and is related to 
the size of the enterprise, which means the larger size of the general enterprise would 
produce the larger EVA value. Therefore, this paper would normalize the EVA by using 
the economic value added rate of return (REVA), which divides the EVA by the total 
capital. 
 
As the two traditional indicators to measure the profitability of banks, Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are used (Heffernan and Fu, 2010; Bennaceur and 
Goaied 2008; Sufian and Chong 2008; Sufian 2009; Heffernan and Fu 2010; Ali et al., 
2011). Specifically, ROA is the ratio of the net income of a bank to the total assets, 
which refers to the ability to use entire funds to obtain profits (Bennaceur and Goaied 
2008; Sufian and Chong 2008; Sufian 2009; Heffernan and Fu 2010, Ali et al., 2011, 
Aladwan 2015 ; Petria et al., 2015). ROE is an important indicator that shareholders 
usually consider and is directly related to shareholder wealth, reflecting the return on 
investment of banks. This indicator has a positive relation with the profitability of banks. 
The larger the value, the stronger the profitability of banks' capital. Therefore, this paper 
will use REVA, ROA and ROE as the dependent variables. 
 
4.3 Independent variables 
According to the nine hypotheses proposed in Section 3 on the determinants of EVA, 
nine corresponding independent variables will be proposed.  
 
 LNTA: the natural logarithm of total assets, which is a measure of bank size. 
Because its large value might cause heteroscedasticity, it would be adjusted by 
natural logarithm. According to Hypothesis 1, the higher the LNTA, the higher the 
EVA. 
 LOAN/TA: measures the liquidity of banks, which is the ratio of total loans 
divided by total assets. According to Hypothesis 2, the higher the LOAN/TA, the 
lower the EVA. 
 LLR: implies how much provision prepared for the loan loss compared with the 
total loan, which shows the credit risk of banks. Based on Hypothesis 3, a negative 
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relationship with EVA is expected.  
 C/B: cost to income ratio, which revealed the operational efficiency of the bank. 
According to Hypothesis 4, the higher C/B implies lower operational efficiency 
and EVA. 
 CAR: capital adequacy ratio, that is, ratio of equity capital to total assets 
(Bennaceur and Goaied, 2008; Heffernan and Fu, 2010; Ali et al, 2011; Petria et 
al, 2015). According to Hypothesis 5, CAR has a negative relationship with EVA. 
 NIIR: measure the level of innovation in a bank, which is the ratio of non-interest 
income to operating income. As Hypothesis 6 shows, the higher NIIR could 
produce higher EVA. 
 EC: is executive compensation and it is an important part of corporate governance. 
This paper will use the average of the top three executive compensation represent 
executive compensation. Due to its large value, it would be adjusted by natural 
logarithm. Based on Hypothesis 7, the high EC would have positive affect on EVA. 
 BODS: the number of executives sits on board including the board of 
commissioners and board of directors, which is a measure of board size. According 
to Hypothesis 8, the larger size of board would cause lower EVA.  
 IND: the proportion of independent directors in the board. According to 
Hypothesis 9, the higher IND implies higher independence of the board, which 
would have positive influence on EVA. 
 
4.4 Empirical Research Model 
Our research models are designed with REVA, ROA, ROE as dependent variables and 
LNTA, LOAN/TA, LLR, C/B, CAR, NIIR, EC, BODS and IND as independent 
variables. The formula of the empirical research model is shown as follows: 
 
REVA/ ROA/ ROE = β0 + β1 LNTA + β2 LOAN/TA + β3 LLR + β4 C/B + β5 CAR + β6 NIIR 
+ β7 EC+ β8 BODS + β9 IND + ε 
 
Where β0 a constant term, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8 and β9 are the regression coefficients 
of the variable and ε is the residual term of the regression equation. 
 
5.1 Descriptive and correlation analysis 
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As reported in Table 2, the average value of REVA is 12.52%, which indicates the 
overall return rate of economic value added is high. The maximum value of REVA is 
21.20% of CMBC in 2012, and the minimum value of that is 3.57% of PAB in 2013. 
This shows that the gap between the value creation capabilities of the 16 sample banks 
is wide. The traditional performance evaluation indicators ROE shows the similar gap 
to REVA, while the ROA of each bank is not much different. 
 
Among the independent variables, the standard deviation of LNTA is large, which 
indicated that the scale of assets of China’s listed banks is very different, especially the 
five major state-owned banks who occupy an absolute advantage. On the other hand, 
the standard deviation of LLR and CAR is relatively small, which means the credit risk 
and capital management of the 16 listed banks are not much different and the overall 
level is balanced. This is mainly because the related laws and regulations have some 
restrictions on credit risk and capital adequacy ratio to protect the normal operation of 
the banking industry. In addition, the average value of LOAN/TA is 47.69%, indicating 
that the liquidity of the Chinese banking industry is good. However, the average value 
of C/B is 72.86% and it represents that the cost to income ratio is high, which may 
cause the inefficiency of bank's operating. The average value of NIIR is 22.64% and is 
increasing by the year, which could imply that with the emergence of new financial 
companies and alternatives, China's banks are increasingly focusing on their own 
innovation capabilities to enhance competitiveness. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, Table 2 shows that the standard deviation of 
executive compensation is high, the minimum of which is ICBC in 2016 with the top 
three executives' per capita salary is 546,633 yuan while the maximum is from PAB in 
2014 reached 752,310 yuan. However, the board size of each bank is relatively 
reasonable, and the average proportion of its independent directors in the board 
accounted for 36.84%, with a standard deviation of 0.0433. This reflects that the 
internal control system of China's listed banks is relatively sound, which could 
effectively improve corporate governance capabilities and play a deterrent role in 
accounting fraud and other acts that undermine the market economy. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
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Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
REVA 96 0.0351  0.2120  0.1252  0.0322  
ROA 96 0.0074  0.0147  0.0109  0.0018  
ROE 96 0.1076  0.2531  0.1703  0.0336  
LNTA 96 26.5633  30.8925  29.0879  1.0827  
LOANTA 96 0.3048  0.5832  0.4769  0.0730  
LLR 96 0.0174  0.0453  0.0273  0.0063  
CB 96 0.5252  1.0471  0.7286  0.1330  
CAR 96 0.0502  0.0821  0.0657  0.0080  
NIIR 96 0.1002  0.3747  0.2264  0.0661  
EC 96 13.2115  15.8335  14.3749  0.6239  
BODS 96 2.0794  2.9957  2.7127  0.1634  
IND 96 0.2500  0.5000  0.3684  0.0433  
*Variable definitions: see section 4.3 
The purpose of the correlation analysis of explanatory variables is to check for the 
multicollinearity between variables and make initial testing of the main hypotheses. 
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Table 3 Pearson correlation coefficient analysis 
  LNTA LOAN/TA LLR C/B CAR NIIR EC BODS IND 
LNTA 1         
LOAN/TA 0.684 1        
LLR 0.026 -0.282 1       
C/B 0.12 0.083 0.107 1      
CAR 0.596 0.586 -0.127 0.193 1     
NIIR 0.477 0.32 -0.107 0.793 0.474 1    
EC -0.406 -0.128 -0.285 0.299 -0.41 0.071 1   
BODS -0.084 0.085 -0.188 -0.083 -0.115 0.038 0.122 1  
IND 0.032 0.132 -0.145 -0.024 0.062 -0.024 0.021 -0.279 1 
*Variable definitions: see section 4.3 
 
From the correlation coefficient between the variables in Table 4.3, except that the 
correlation coefficient between C/B and NIIR is 0.793 which indicates that the 
correlation between these two is high, the correlation between other variables is not 
very strong. This means that the multicollinearity problem does not occur between the 
variables selected in this paper. 
 
5.2. Main analysis and discussion. 
To test our research hypotheses, this paper uses a multiple linear regression model to 
analyze the factors affecting the REVA value of China’s listed banks. We also use return 
on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) as robustness proxies of EVA. The 
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Table 4: The regression results of the determinants of REVA, ROE and ROA 
VARIABLES REVA ROE ROA 
LNTA 0.00844 0.00722** 0.000473** 
 
[1.646] [2.169] [2.161] 
LOAN/TA -0.0131 0.0176 -0.0000918 
 
[-0.197] [0.409] [-0.0324] 
LLR 0.347*** 0.476 0.0252 
 
[2.993] [1.254] [1.011] 
C/B -0.161*** -0.263*** -0.0161*** 
 
[-3.287] [-8.275] [-7.691] 
CAR -1.857*** -2.244*** 0.00971 
 
[-3.378] [-6.292] [0.414] 
NIIR 0.245** 0.233*** 0.0136*** 
 
[2.221] [3.257] [2.878] 
EC 0.00887 0.0206*** 0.00125*** 
 
[1.379] [4.939] [4.556] 
BODS -0.00821 0.00358 -0.000238 
 
[-0.415] [0.279] [-0.0282] 
IND -0.0957 -0.0562 -0.0019 
 
[-1.392] [-1.260] [-0.646] 
Constant -0.0483 -0.0604 -0.0127 
 
[-0.233] [-0.449] [-1.439] 
Observations 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.368 0.756 0.627 
*Variable definitions: see section 4.3 
 
As reported in table 4, the explanatory power of the model is good, as its F statistic is 
significant at the level of 1% and the R-squared of this model is 36.80%.1 Our findings 
                         
1 We added some macro-factors to control the influence of environments. We added Inflation (INF), annual real GDP growth rate 
(GDPG) and annual unemployment rate (UNEMP). The findings as expected and consistent with prior studies (i.e. Heffernan & 
Fu 2010) suggesting that bank performance appears to improve in an environment of falling employment and rising GDP growth 
rates. The findings are un-tabulated analysis. 
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indicate that the credit risk (LLR), has a significance coefficient with a value of 0.347, 
which indicates that for every 1% increase in the ratio of loan loss provision to total 
loan, the bank's REVA value will increase by 0.347%. The LLR is positively related 
with EVA, which is against our expectation in hypothesis 3. However, this result is 
consistent with the findings of Sufian (2009), Heffernan and Fu (2010) and Sun et al 
(2017). There are two possible explanations for this result. The first is based on the 
assumptions of Berger and DeYoung (1997) that banks reasonably reduce short-term 
costs, including the provision of loan loss, to maximize long-term profits (Sufian, 2009). 
The second possible reason is that banks have different attitudes toward risk. Although 
the greater the risk, the greater the profit, it may also bring greater losses. Therefore, 
banks that are more cautious will increase their provision of loan loss, which shows the 
bank's cautiousness and timeliness in estimating its non-performing loans. 
 
The findings also suggest that the impact coefficient of C/B on REVA is -0.161, which 
means that every one-percentage point reduction in C/B will increase the bank's REVA 
by 0.161 percentage points. The lower the C/B, the higher the banks operational 
efficiency and the EVA value, which confirms Hypothesis 4. This result is consistent 
with most previous studies, in which Sufian (2009), Heffernan and Fu (2010) and Petra 
et al. (2015) documented that high operational efficiency contributes to the 
improvement of banking performance. 
 
As predicted by hypothesis 5, capital management has a negative relation with the EVA 
value of China’s banks. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) which represents capital 
management is significant at the 1% level. In general, as the capital adequacy ratio 
increases, the bank's ability to resist risks increases. However, this also increases the 
financing cost of banks, and the fewer funds the banks use to issue loans. For banks 
that based on deposit and loan spread income, higher capital adequacy ratios would 
affect the bank’s operating efficiency, causing the reduction in EVA indicators. These 
findings are consistent with prior study (Heffernan and Fu 2010; Petria et al. 2015; Ali 
et al. 2011). In addition, the EVA indicator itself would be constrained by the cost of 
capital. The increase in the bank's capital adequacy ratio would lead to the expansion 
of capital scale and the increase of capital cost. Therefore, how to balance the 
relationship between risk control and investment profit with the optimization of bank 
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capital structure to achieve the goal of maximizing corporate value is further explored. 
 
Moreover, the non-interest income ratio (NIIR) is positive and significant at the 5% 
significant level. This is in line with Sufian and Chong (2008) and the assumptions of 
Hypothesis 6 for financial innovation. Nowadays, the bank's profit mainly comes from 
the spread of income between deposits and loans. However, the business requires the 
bank to pay a certain capital cost to realize the income. The intermediate business does 
not have this problem, which is similar to the “non-cost business” comparing with the 
bank's traditional deposit and loan business (Sufian and Chong, 2008). Therefore, 
focusing on resources to expand the intermediary business is conducive to optimizing 
the bank's income structure and reducing the bank's credit risk, thereby enhancing the 
bank's profitability. 
 
Besides the above four factors affecting EVA, bank Size (LNTA), liquidity (LOAN/TA), 
executive compensation (EC), board size (BODS) and proportion of independent 
directors (IND) are not significant. In particular, although some studies suggest that 
companies with larger board size would achieve greater performance (Tulun and 
Ramdani, 2018), and others such as Tulun and Ramdani (2018) had reached the 
opposite conclusion. Mariappan and Thyagarajan (2018) find that the size of the board 
and the company's performance are inversely U-shaped, and the best board size is 6 to 
9 people. Thus, as a further analysis we separated the sample into three groups: banks 
with less than 13 member, banks with 13 -16 members, and above 16 members. Then, 
we re-estimate our baseline model. The findings, as reported in Table 5, suggest a 
negative relationship between board size and performance if the board size above 16. 
This implies that the number of members of the board cannot reflect the efficiency of 
the board's operations. For the effectiveness of bank board governance, the number of 
members is not the key. Only by establishing a sound operation mechanism of the board 
can it be truly effective. This also suggest that as the size of the board of directors 
expands, the agency problem becomes more prominent and the coordination and 
communication between the board members become more difficult , then the negative 
effect of the communication would exceed its positive effect (Fernandes et al, 2018). 
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Moreover, the proportion of independent directors (INDIA) is also not related to the 
three performance evaluation indicators selected in this paper, which indicates that the 
independence of board members has no significant impact on the performance of 
China's listed banks. This is contrary to the research by scholars such as Tulun and 
Ramdani (2018) and Mariappan and Thyagarajan (2018). In conclusion, it might be due 
to the weak corporate governance of the Chinese banking industry as a whole. 
Table 5: The regression results of the determinants of REVA using sub-samples 
based on board size  
Variables  (BODS < 13)  (BODS between13 and 16)  (BODS < 16) 
LNTA 0.0183** 0.0462 0.00933 
 
[2.658] [0.738] [1.632] 
LOAN/TA -0.0135 -0.903 0.0854 
 
[-0.0778] [-1.150] [1.061] 
LLR 6.597** 2.36 0.274 
 
[2.681] [0.357] [0.374] 
C/B -0.136** -0.258 0.0118 
 
[-2.454] [-0.706] [0.346] 
CAR -2.017* -3.44 -1.814*** 
 
[-1.765] [-0.859] [-2.752] 
EC -0.0072 0.00237 0.0244*** 
 
[-0.583] [0.0574] [3.187] 
BODS -0.00966 -0.493 -0.0927** 
 
[-0.386] [-1.767] [-2.173] 
IND -0.108 0.00866 -0.135 
 
[-1.508] [0.0201] [-1.189] 
Constant -0.166 0.899 -0.125 
  [-0.616] [0.514] [-0.503] 
Observations 32 13 51 
R-squared 0.747 0.75 0.476 
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As a robustness proxies of REVA, this paper use two traditional performance evaluation 
indicators (ROE and ROA). Using ROA and ROE, the regression results are shown in 
Table 4. The findings of ROE and ROA mostly are consistent with the findings of REVA. 
For bank size, the expansion of the bank size will generally bring certain economies of 
scale. As reported in Table 4, under the ROA and ROE models, LNTA is significant at 
the 5% level. However, consistent with the results of the recent studies, this paper find 
that there the relationship between REVA and LNTA is not significant (Bennaceur and 
Goaied, 2008; Heffernan and Fu, 2010; Ali et al, 2011; Petria et al, 2015). This implies 
that it is no longer advisable to increase bank performance by blindly expanding the 
scale of assets. Likewise, it is unrealistic to rely solely on the increase in the number of 
loans to increase REVA (Heffernan and Fu, 2010). However, instead, our findings 
suggesting that improving bank performance by increasing financial innovation is the 
direction of future bank development.  
 
Consistent with EVA findings, the two factors of bank corporate governance (board size 
and board independence), are not significant, which against our expectations in 
Hypothesis 8 and 9. However, we report that EC is significant at the 1% level in the 
models with ROA and ROE as the dependent variables. In general, the increase in the 
average salary of bank executives is beneficial to alleviate agency problem and thus 
obtain more profit (Omoregie and Kelikume, 2017; Malmi and Ikäheimo 2003). 
However, the regression results of REVA in this paper show that executive 
compensation cannot be increased indefinitely, and banks could adopt other methods 
such as equity incentives to improve the enthusiasm of managers.  
 
6. Conclusions and limitations 
The main purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the EVA model in the 
Chinese banking industry. To achieve the goal, this paper uses the banks listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 2012-2017 as samples and the EVA model 
was used to evaluate the operating performance of banks. Our empirical results suggest 
that the decisive factors affecting the EVA value of China's listed banks are credit risk 
(LLR), operational efficiency (C/B), capital management (CAR) and the degree of 
innovation (NIIR). Except for the above four factors, the other five factors did not have 
significant impact on REVA. However, it is worth noting that bank executive 
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compensation is positively related to ROA and ROE. 
 
Thus, our findings suggest that improving the operation efficiency and the degree of 
innovation, ensuring a certain level of credit risk and controlling a certain level of 
capital adequacy ratio could help improve the bank's operating performance. 
Developing diversified intermediary businesses and accelerating the pace of financial 
innovation is the future direction for the bank's development. Besides, the Chinese 
banks should also pay attention to optimize their corporate governance, especially the 
salary incentive mechanism. 
 
This paper has some limitations. Firstly, due to a large number of adjustments to 
accounting items are required in the application of EVA when evaluating business 
performance, some items of EVA model in this paper have been simplified, which may 
cause the bank's EVA value to deviate slightly from the actual situation. Moreover, the 
sample includes only listed banks, so our results cannot generalized to non-listed banks, 
such as some small and medium-sized commercial banks. Therefore, in the future’s 
research, the calculation of EVA could be more precise and the sample size of China's 
banks could be expanded. Furthermore, the impact of macro factors on banks' EVA 
could be appropriately considered when studying the determinants. Finally, our study 
employs individual elements of corporate governance. Future research can use 
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Appendix A 
Table 1 16 Listed Banks of China in 2012 
Five large commercial banks Stock Code 
1 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 601398 
2 China Construction Bank (CCB) 601939 
3 Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 601288 
4 Bank of China (BOC) 601988 
5 Bank of Communications (BOCOM) 
601328 
Eight national joint stock commercial banks  
6 China Merchants Bank (CMB) 600036 
7 China Minsheng Bank (CMBC) 600016 
8 Industrial Bank (IB) 601166 
9 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPDB) 600000 
10 China CITIC Bank (CITIC) 601998 
11 China Everbright Bank (CEB) 601818 
12 Huaxia Bank (HX) 600015 
13 Ping An Bank (PAB) 000001 
Three city commercial banks  
14 Bank of Beijing (BOB) 601169 
15 Bank of Ningbo (BONB) 002142 
16 Bank of Nanjing (BONJ) 601009 
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Appendix B 
Description of Variables 
Dependent Variables Description 
REVA EVA/Total Capital 
ROA Net Income/Average Assets 
ROE Net Income/Average Equity 
Independent variables Determinants Description 
LNTA  Bank Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
LOAN/TA Liquidity Total loans/Total assets 
LLR Credit Risk Loan loss provision/Total loan 
C/B Operational Efficiency Total operating expenses/net-Interest income 
CAR Capital Management Equity capital/Total assets 
NIIR Degree of innovation Non-interest income/Operating income 
EC Executive compensation The natural logarithm of the average of the top three executive compensation 
BODS Board Size 
The number of executives sits on board including the board of commissioners and 




The number of independent commissioners/ Total number of the board 
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